Published by Simpkin Marshall About this Item: Simpkin Marshall, Volume 2. Gilt design on front and back boards.
Patterned page edges. Tight binding.
In poor condition, suitable as a reading copy. No date; Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,grams, ISBN: Seller Inventory Published by Frederick Warne and Co, London Cloth bound; gilt on spine and front board; blind stamping; edges scruffed; spine splitting; clean text; Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,grams, ISBN: Seller Inventory Volumes 1 and 2.
Volume Octavo, marbled covers, half brown leather, gilt lettering and design on backstrip, shelf wear, gilt top edge, marbled end pages, pages are clean, text is clear. Published by Routledge, About this Item: Routledge, , Condition: Used; Good. Fast Dispatch. Expedited UK Delivery Available. Excellent Customer Service. Volume Two. Spine worn. Seller Inventory BBI Navy cloth with gilt lettering. Cracking to hinge but binding remains tight with crisp pages and bold text. Foxing, tanning and some marks to text block edges and endpapers.
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Mildly rubbed and marked boards with lightly bumped corners and wear to edges. Tanned spine with crushed ends and wear. Seller Inventory CLK. Burgundy cloth boards with gilt decoration. Good bright pages. Mild foxing to the endpapers. A few uncut pages. Minor edge wear with corner bumping and scuffing. Good boards with minimal wear. Bright gilt. Spine sunned. Seller Inventory NIC. Blue cloth boards with gilt lettering. Pages and binding are presentable with no major defects.
Between Dissent and Peacemaking. The Dutch Nobility on the Eve of the Revolt (1564-1567)
Minor issues present such as mild cracking, inscriptions, inserts, light foxing, tanning and thumb marking. Overall a good condition item. Boards have mild shelf wear with light rubbing and corner bumping.
Some light marking and sunning. Seller Inventory LRP. And London And London, Volumes 1 , 2 , 3 All cloth bound and clean inside. Volume one: front board, backstrip, and back board are loose. Volume 2: Backstrip torn at top.
Published by London, Routledge,. About this Item: London, Routledge,. All volumes thick royal 8vo. This might have incited them to demand a higher risk premium. He was a merchant, who also performed other services, for instance, the purchase of fuses from a fuse maker in Utrecht. In any case he did not advance the total arrears that began to arise from The province suffered from the siege of July and August of The infrequent payments between and were probably also the result of payments to the military being prioritised.
In , the States of Groningen stipulated that interest payments came second after the troops were paid, favouring those that had matured the longest time ago. In exchange for more autonomy over legal, administrative and financial matters, the Generality demanded at least two months of payment to the soldiers.
The States-General simultaneously urged the States of Groningen to pay at least one year of interest to the creditors in Holland. First, it designated certain taxes to fund the debt to pay the interest payments on life and redeemable annuities. Finally, the States summoned Indisraven to Groningen to collect the money to pay the first instalment in Amsterdam.https://artrespopbackpets.gq
The Footsteps of St. Gaspar: R * A * S S . G Fr. Jeffrey Keyes
This was probably ineffective as negotiations with Holland creditors continued while arrears accrued. From that moment the States received complaints, transmitted by Indisraven, that creditors in Holland received unequal payments. These partial and irregular payments might be interpreted as part of the ongoing renegotiations with the Holland creditors. Buying these annuities through the secondary market was consequently cheaper than reimbursing the creditors at face value. The dismissal of Indisraven as broker for Groningen in the same month is presumably best explained from the perspective of these renegotiations.
The States of Groningen dismissed him because of continued payments to creditors in Holland. If Indisraven then still paid these creditors, that strategy would have had little effect. In spite of his dismissal, Indisraven, reappeared twice to receive instalments, in and , destined for interest payments on both life and redeemable annuities.
Hiding in a Twilight Zone
It moreover shows that the secondary market for public debt within the Dutch Republic was already well-developed. In , the province negotiated a contract with Christoff count of Rantzow concerning his four life annuities. The payments of this redemption money were to be made in three equal instalments: one immediately, the other two through the office of Hendrik Staats and sons in Amsterdam. It was stipulated that if the remaining two payments were too late, the entire arrangement would be void. In that case the previous payment should be considered as partial redemption on the arrears, whereas the interest was to be paid according to the original conditions of the life annuities contract with priority in Amsterdam.
Perhaps the problem was that the conditions and prospects within this group of creditors varied more than for the redeemable annuity holders. This larger variation was the result of the design of the asset, since the expected returns depended on the life expectancy of each individual nominee. Hence, it might have been the case that the nature of the life annuity caused too much heterogeneity to reach a solution that would satisfy all life annuity holders equally. For a while, both life annuity holders and possessors of redeemable annuities suffered from the postponed payments that resulted from liquidity problems.
Whereas the latter managed to negotiate a deal, the former did not. Although the creditors in Holland as a group were targeted, the differentiation between redeemable annuity holders and life annuity holders was the outcome of a renegotiation process and not a premeditated plan. The redeemable annuity holders accepted an interest reduction in return for a resumption of payment, the large majority of the life annuity holders did not receive a penny for the next 75 years to come.
Consequently, this case demonstrates why coordinating punishment proves so difficult for bondholders. Usually a state in default could not issue new loans. Creditors barred defaulting states from new loans until the old debts were restructured. Consequently, credit rationing confined the duration of the default to the moment the defaulter needed to borrow money again, mostly within a few years.
Part of the persistence of the default can be attributed to the changing attitude of the Generality. Whereas the Generality stood for the rights of the unpaid creditors in Holland during the s, it shielded Groningen from the unpaid life annuity holders in the eighteenth century. As a lever, it withheld its payments to the Generality, until the other provinces had paid their contributions.
Hence, it was in the clear mutual interest of the Generality and the Groningen provincial administration to maintain the border fortresses in good condition.
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However, whereas fully sovereign borrowers had to come to terms with the market in order to issue new debt, Groningen was offered an escape route by borrowing under guarantee of the States-General. Groningen did not need the free market to obtain the loan. This made credit rationing an ineffective means for contract enforcement. This becomes clear from the report by the aforementioned generality-commission in It demonstrates that credible commitment to debt would be pushed aside if one could come away relatively unharmed. In the process of renegotiation of its arrears, the States of Groningen discovered that the Generality offered an escape route.
This escape was the trade-off of diminished fiscal autonomy in return for access to the capital market via the States-General. This allowed the Groningers to circumvent the capital markets punishment for a default, such as credit rationing or higher interest rates charged. It was rather the outcome of the interaction between the creditors, the States of Groningen and the Generality. This explains the evolution from arrears that turned into a gradual and piecemeal default and eventually an outright repudiation of the debt. When so urged by the States-General in the late s, the States of Groningen attempted to pay the interest in arrears.
The temporary make-shifts and ad hoc money transfers in the s indicate attempts to restructure the debt. This left the life annuity holders to their own devices. Consequently, they fell victim to increasing arrears that gradually evolved into a default. The outright repudiation of that share of the debt, only followed from the protection the Generality offered to the States of Groningen. Firstly, it needed to secure its own income.
It depended heavily on the provincial contributions to foot the bill. A failure to pay the military was dangerous and its own revenue stream but small. Issuing debt on behalf of the provinces helped to smooth its liquidity shortages. Therefore, it granted Groningen the possibility of borrowing under its guarantee.